

Official Journal of the European Union

L 109 I



English edition

Legislation

Volume 66

24 April 2023

Contents

II *Non-legislative acts*

REGULATIONS

- ★ **Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/844 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria** 1
- ★ **Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/845 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them** 13
- ★ **Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/846 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran** 15

DECISIONS

- ★ **Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/847 of 24 April 2023 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria** 26
- ★ **Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/848 of 24 April 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them** 38
- ★ **Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/849 of 24 April 2023 implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran** 40

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Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

II

(Non-legislative acts)

REGULATIONS

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/844

of 24 April 2023

implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 32(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 18 January 2012, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.
- (2) The Council remains deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. After more than a decade, the conflict in Syria is far from over and remains a source of suffering and instability.
- (3) The Council notes that the Syrian regime continues to pursue its policy of repression. In view of the gravity of the situation which persists, the Council considers it necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them while maintaining their targeted and differentiated approach, and bearing in mind the humanitarian conditions of the Syrian population. The Council considers that certain categories of persons and entities are of particular relevance for the effectiveness of those restrictive measures, given the specific context prevailing in Syria.
- (4) The Council has assessed that regime-affiliated militias support the Syrian regime in its repressive policies, commit abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law on behalf of the Syrian regime, and that their members present a serious risk of further committing such violations. In recent years there has been a rise of private security companies operating in Syria, which act as shell companies for regime-affiliated militias and support them through activities such as the recruitment of members. The Council therefore considers that further restrictive measures are necessary to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by members of Syrian regime-affiliated militias, as well as persons and entities linked to certain private security companies which support such regime-affiliated militias, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.

(¹) OJ L 16, 19.1.2012, p. 1.

- (5) The Council is deeply concerned about the rise in narcotics trade originating in Syria. The Council has in particular assessed that the trade in amphetamines has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime, and providing it with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression. The Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by certain persons and entities involved in the production or trafficking of narcotics originating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, in order to prevent them from providing support to the regime and increase pressure on the regime to change its policies of repression. These measures also aim to reduce the risk of undermining the effectiveness of restrictive measures by targeting the regime's ability to resort to proceeds from narcotics trade to continue its policy of repression.
- (6) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 25 persons and 8 entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.
- (7) Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added to the list set out in Section A (Persons):

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'327.	Wasim Badia AL-ASSAD وسيم بديع الأسد	Date of birth: 18.7.1980; Place of birth: Qardaha/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Wasim Badia al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad's cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family. Wasim Badia al-Assad is also involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. In particular, he has been involved in the production of Captagon and is responsible for drug shipments. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
328.	Samer Kamal AL-ASSAD a.k.a. 'Samir' سامر كمال الأسد	Date of birth: 19.5.1973; Place of birth: Qardaha, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Samer Kamal al-Assad is a member of the Assad family. He operates in the context of the narcotics trade, in particular in its production. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
329.	Mudar Rifaat AL-ASSAD a.k.a. 'Rifa'at' مضر رفعت الأسد	Date of birth: 1964; Place of birth: Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Mudar Rifaat al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad's cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.	24.4.2023
330.	Mohammad SHALISH محمد شاليش	Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Mohammad Shalish has close ties to the regime. He is linked to drug operations and more specifically to the Captagon trade in the Latakia region. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
331.	Waseem Omar AL-MASALMA وسيم عمر المسالمة	Date of birth: 27.8.1981; Place of birth: Bosra Al-Sham/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Waseem Omar al-Masalma is a leader of a regime-affiliated militia. Waseem Omar al-Masalma is involved in the regime-led trade in Captagon in Southern Syria, especially in Deraa. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
332.	Amer Tayseer KHITI عامر تيسير خيتي	Date of birth: 31.7.1980; Place of birth: Douma/Rif Dimashq Governorate/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Amer Tayseer Khiti is a leading businessperson operating in Syria with interests in real estate, construction and industry. He has close ties to the Assad family. He is a supporter of president al-Assad and organised rallies for him. Amer Tayseer Khiti is also involved in Captagon smuggling operations and bought up real estate in order to invest in packaging facilities used for drug smuggling. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
333.	Abdellatif HAMID a.k.a. 'Hamida' عبد اللطيف حميدة	Date of birth: 1.12.1977; Place of birth: Aleppo, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Abdellatif Hamid has close ties to the Assad family. Abdellatif Hamid owns a factory in Aleppo that has been implicated in Captagon production and trafficking. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
334.	Nouh ZAITER Noah ZAITER Noah ZAYTAR نوح زعيتر	Date of birth: 1977; Place of birth: Zahle, Lebanon; Nationality: Lebanese; Gender: male	Nouh Zaiter is associated with members of the Assad family. He is involved in the trafficking of Captagon in Lebanon and Syria. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
335.	Taher AL-KAYALI طاهر الكيالي	Date of birth: 13.12.1959; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Taher Al-Kayali is a Syrian businessman who owns several companies including Neptunus LLC. Through his companies he is involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, especially in terms of transportation from the port of Latakia. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
336.	Imad Abu ZUREIQ Emad Abu ZURAIQ Imad Abu ZREIK عماد أبو زريق	Date of birth: 1982; Place of birth: Nasib, Daraa (Syria); Nationality: Syrian; Suspected location: Daraa, Syria; Gender: male	Imad Abu Zureiq is a leading member of a regime-affiliated militia in Southwest Syria that reports directly to the Syrian regime's Military Security branch. Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
337.	Mustafa AL-MASALMAH a.k.a. Mustafa AL-KASAM/QASIM مصطفى المسالمة/الكسيم	Nationality: Syrian; Suspected location: Daraa al-Balad, Syria; Gender: male	Mustafa al-Masalmah leads a regime-affiliated militia that reports directly to the Syrian regime's Military Security branch. Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in the synthetic drug Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime, and is associated with it.	24.4.2023
338.	Hassan Muhammad DAQQOU حسن محمد دقو	Date of birth: 1.2.1985; Place of birth: Tfail, Lebanon; Nationality: Syrian/Lebanese; Gender: male	Hassan Muhammad Daqqou has close ties with the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Daqqou has established a wide drug trafficking network in Lebanon and Syria and built Captagon manufacturing plants close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
339.	Jihad BARAKAT جهاد بركات	Date of birth: 1964; Place of birth: Qardahah/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Jihad Barakat is, through marriage, associated with the Assad family. He is also leader of a regime-affiliated militia and continues to hold different military and intelligence functions for the regime.	24.4.2023
340.	Raji FALHOUT راجي فلحوط	Date of birth: 3.10.1985; Place of birth: Atil, Syria; Position: Syrian regime-affiliated militia leader; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Raji Falhout leads a militia that is associated with the Syrian Military Intelligence. Raji Falhout is also involved in drug trafficking linked to Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
341.	Muhammad ABDO ASSAAD a.k.a. Asa'ad محمد عبده أسعد	Date of birth: 19.7.1975; Place of birth: Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Assaad Building, Main Street, Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside; Other identifying information: Father: Abdo Assaad; Gender: male	Muhammad Abdo Assaad is the leader of the Hosn al-Watan militia, which fought on behalf of the Syrian regime. Most recently, he has founded the Aman for Protection and Security LLC, which offers private security services and operates as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
342.	Samer AL-DIBIS سامر الدبیس (a.k.a. Samer AL-DIBS, Samir)	Date of birth: 30.3.1962; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Naher Street, Rawda, Damascus, Syria; Gender: male	Samer al-Dibis is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active in several sectors of the economy, especially in the chemical industry and in real estate. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council and the chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry. He is also a member of Parliament and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. In these functions Samer al-Dibis benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
343.	Ali Najib IBRAHIM علي نجيب إبراهيم (a.k.a. Ali NajeebIBRAHIM)	Date of birth: 1991; Position: businessperson; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Al-Malki, Damascus, Syria; Gender: male	Ali Najib Ibrahim is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active also in the telecommunications sector. He owns several shell companies, which have been linked to the Syrian regime in attempts to circumvent sanctions. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
344.	Jamal ISMAIL a.k.a. Ismael جمال إسماعيل	Nationality: Syrian; Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate; Gender: male	Jamal al-Ismael was the commander of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when his unit killed at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon ('Tadamon massacre'). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023
345.	Jamal AL-KHATIB جمال الخطيب	Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate	Jamal al-Khatib was a commanding officer in Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon ('Tadamon massacre'). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023
346.	Osama AL-MALIKI a.k.a. Usama أسامة المالكي	Date of birth: 1963; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Villa 98, Sharqiyyat, Jazira al-Khamisa, Qura al-Assad, Damascus Countryside, Syria; Other identifying information: Father: Mohammad al-Maliki – محمد المالكي Gender: male	Osama al-Maliki is majority owner of Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Osama al-Maliki therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
347.	Fadi SAQR فادي أحمد (a.k.a. Fady SAKR, Fadi SAQER, Fadi SAQIR)	Date of birth: 1975 Place of birth: Jablah, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Fadi Saqr is a leader of the “National Defense Forces” (NDF) militia in Damascus that has fought on behalf of the regime since at least 2012. Fadi Saqr therefore is a member of a regime-affiliated militia. Fadi Saqr was part of the chain of command in the massacre of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon on 13 April 2013 (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023
348.	Ahmad Ali TAHER احمد علي طاهر	Date of birth: 1982; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor; Associated individuals: Brother: Khodr Taher; Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC; Other identifying information: Father: Ali Taher; Gender: male	Ahmad Ali Taher owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
349.	Amjad YOUSSEF a.k.a. Yusuf, Yousef أمجد يوسف	Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Amjad Youssef is a Warrant Officer in the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate. He was a member of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013, when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (‘Tadamon massacre’). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
350.	Osama RAMADAN a.k.a. Usama أسامة رمضان	Date of birth: 1973; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor; Business Associate: Ahmad Ali Taher; Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC; Other identifying information: Father: Hassan Ramadan; Gender: male	Osama Ramadan owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by the Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
351.	Ali Mhanna SULEIMAN علي مهنا سليمان	Date of birth: 1987; Place of birth: Al-Raml, Kherbet Maaza, Tartus, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Tartus, Khirbit Maaza, 36th Estate, Ghaya Estate Area; National ID Number: 10040018920; Father's Name: Mhanna; Mother's Name: Insaf; Gender: male	Ali Suleiman was the leader of the Sahab Regiment of a Syrian Arab Army division known as "Tiger Forces". He is a close associate of Suhayl Hassan. He has been involved in financing the regime, including through the smuggling of fuel. He also benefits from his association with the regime, such as from opportunities in real estate development. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023'

(2) the following entries are added to the list set out in Section B (entities):

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'83.	Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army الفرقة الرابع	Place of registration: Damascus; Principal place of business: Syrian regime territory in Syria; Associated individuals: Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Belal	The Fourth Armoured Division is one of the most prominent military units of the Syrian army led by Maher al-Assad and commanded by Ghassan Bilal. The Fourth Armoured Division is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population. The Fourth Armoured Division also profits from the war economy, especially the trafficking in Captagon. Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. Therefore, the Fourth Armoured Division benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
84.	Neptunus LLC/Neptune LLC company شركة نبتونوس المحدودة المسؤولة نبتونس أوفرسيز المحدودة	Place of registration: Lattakia, Syria; Date of registration: 2017	Neptunus LLC is involved in drug operations in the port of Latakia. Neptunus LLC therefore benefits and supports the regime. Neptunus LLC was co-founded by Taher Al-Kayali.	24.4.2023
85.	Areen foundation/مؤسسة العرين	Place of registration: Syria; Date of registration: 1999; Principal place of business: Syria; Associated individuals: Asma al-Assad (wife of Bashar al-Assad and Director)	The al-Areen foundation poses as a charitable foundation, but is closely affiliated with Syrian regime militias. The al-Areen foundation is directed by the president's wife, Asma Al-Assad. The foundation is channelling aid in line with the policies and priorities of the regime, and therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
86.	Stroytransgaz/Стройтрансгаз	Other information: Stroytransgaz Group, Stroytransgaz (STG) Logistic, Stroytransgaz (STG) Engineering, STG Engineering	Stroytransgaz is a Russian engineering and construction company operating in Syria, which amongst other things assumed control of Syria's largest phosphate mines. Stroytransgaz therefore benefits from and supports the Syrian regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
87.	Gecopham, the General Company for Phosphate and Mines الشركة العامة للفوسفات و المناجم	Address: Palmyra Road, Homs, Syrian Arab Republic; Phone: 00963312751122; Email: info@gecopham.sy; General Manager: Younes Ramadan	Gecopham is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and provides financial support to the regime. It therefore supports the regime.	24.4.2023
88.	Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC شركة الجبل لخدمات الحماية والحراسة	Address: F6XR+495, Malek Bin Rabeaa, Damascus, Syria; Type of entity: Limited Liability Company; Place of registration: Damascus; Date of registration: 19.10.2017; Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria; Associated individuals: Osama Mohammad al-Maliki	Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC is owned and managed by Osama al-Maliki. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
89.	Castle for Security and Protection LLC شركة القلعة للحماية والحراسة والخدمات الأمني a.k.a. Castle Security and Protection LLC, Citadel for Security and Protection	Address: Saraya Roundabout, Western Villas, Mazze, Damascus, Syria; Type of entity: Limited Liability Company; Place of registration: Damascus, Syria; Date of registration: 18.10.2017; Registration number:/ Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria; Other information: Sector: Militia turned Security Company; Phone Number: +963116119331; +963943800808	Castle for Security and Protection LLC is a private company, which acts as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, which is led by Maher al-Assad. Castle for Security is involved also in the trafficking of narcotics. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
90.	Aman for Protection and Security LLC شركة أمان للحماية والحراسة الأمنية	Address: Damascus Countryside; Type of entity: Limited Liability Company; Place of registration: Damascus Countryside; Date of registration: 10.10.2018; Registration number: 2906; Principal place of business: Damascus Countryside, Syria; Associated individuals: Muhammad Abdo Assad	Aman for Protection and Security LLC is a private security company, which acts as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia, founded by Muhammad Abdo Assaad. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023'

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/845**of 24 April 2023****implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20 September 2016 imposing additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2016/1686.
- (2) In view of the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, two persons and one group should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686.
- (3) Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 255, 21.9.2016, p. 1.

ANNEX

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added under heading 'A. Natural persons referred to in Article 3':

- '15. Abu Yasir HASSAN (a.k.a. Sheikh Hassan, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan, Yaseer Hassan, Abu Qasim); date of birth: 1981 to 1983; place of birth: Pwani Region, Tanzania; gender: male; nationality: Tanzanian.
16. Bonomade Machude OMAR (a.k.a. Ibn Omar, Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, Abu Sorraca, Abu Surakha, Abu Suraqa Suraqa Filho, Omar Saide, Sheikh Omar); date of birth: 15 June 1988; place of birth: Palma district, Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique; gender: male; nationality: Mozambican.;

(2) the following entry is added under heading 'B. Legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 3':

- '5. ISIS-Mozambique (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique, Islamic State -Mozambique, ISIL-M, Ansar Al-Sunna, Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab in Mozambique, Mozambique Wilaya of the Islamic State, Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaah (ASwJ), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa, Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, Ahlu Sunnah Wajamo, Swahili Sunna).'

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/846**of 24 April 2023****implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 12(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 359/2011.
- (2) On 25 September 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union deploring the widespread and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against non-violent protestors, noting that it had resulted in the loss of lives as well as a large number of injuries. The declaration also spelled out that those responsible for the killing of Mahsa Amini must be held accountable, and called on the Iranian authorities to ensure transparent and credible investigations to clarify the number of deaths and arrests, to release all non-violent protestors and to provide due process to all detainees. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that Iran's decision to severely restrict internet access and block instant messaging platforms blatantly violates freedom of expression. Finally, the declaration stated that the Union will consider all options at its disposal to address the killing of Mahsa Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations.
- (3) In this context, and in line with the Union's commitment to address all issues of concern with Iran, including the human rights situation, as confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2022, eight persons and one entity should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011.
- (4) Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

⁽¹⁾ OJL 100, 14.4.2011, p. 1.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

ANNEX

The following eight persons and one entity are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 359/2011:

Persons

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'214.	NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan بیژن نوباوه وطن	DOB: 1959/1960 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament	Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”. Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them. As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
215.	YAZDIKHAH Ali علی یزدی خواه	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament	<p>Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.</p> <p>He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.</p> <p>Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.</p> <p>As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
216.	ALIBABAEI Mehdi مهدی علی بابایی (a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi)	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Major Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom	<p>Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.</p> <p>Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.</p> <p>Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as “Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood”, ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for “badly veiled” residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.</p> <p>Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.</p> <p>As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
217.	<p>NOUROUZI Ali Asghar (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar)</p>	<p>DOB: 11.11.1962 POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block-B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026 Iranian national ID no: 4591967573 Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
218.	TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami (a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami)	DOB: 26.8.1963 POB: Meybod, Iran Address: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Iranian national ID no: 4489260229 Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC	Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation. The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression. As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
219.	<p>ALAODDINI Yahya (a.k.a. ALA'ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya)</p>	<p>DOB: 21.5.1965 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023 Iranian national ID no: 0036732958 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
220.	BABAMORADI Jamal Ali	<p>DOB: 24.5.1960 POB: Tehran, Iran Address: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Iranian national ID no: 0036824240 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
221.	KARIMI Ahmad Hasan	<p>DOB: 11.12.1962 POB: Qom, Iran Address: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Iranian national ID no: 0382947983 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation</p> <p>Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi</p> <p>Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023'

Entities

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'35.	Ariantel	Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran Website: http://www.ariantel.ir Type of entity: private company	<p>Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran.</p> <p>Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.</p> <p>Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023'

DECISIONS

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2023/847

of 24 April 2023

implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 30(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 31 May 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/255/CFSP.
- (2) The Council remains deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. After more than a decade, the conflict in Syria is far from over and remains a source of suffering and instability.
- (3) The Council notes that the Syrian regime continues to pursue its policy of repression. In view of the gravity of the situation which persists, the Council considers it necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them while maintaining their targeted and differentiated approach, and bearing in mind the humanitarian conditions of the Syrian population. The Council considers that certain categories of persons and entities are of particular relevance for the effectiveness of those restrictive measures, given the specific context prevailing in Syria.
- (4) The Council has assessed that regime-affiliated militias support the Syrian regime in its repressive policies, commit abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law on behalf of the Syrian regime, and that their members present a serious risk of further committing such violations. In recent years there has been a rise of private security companies operating in Syria, which act as shell companies for regime-affiliated militias and support them through activities such as the recruitment of members. The Council therefore considers that further restrictive measures are necessary to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by members of Syrian regime-affiliated militias, as well as persons and entities linked to certain private security companies which support such regime-affiliated militias, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP.
- (5) The Council is deeply concerned about the rise in narcotics trade originating in Syria. The Council has in particular assessed that the trade in amphetamines has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and providing it with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression. The Council considers that it should provide for restrictive measures to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by certain persons and entities involved in the production or trafficking of narcotics originating in Syria, as identified by the Council and listed in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP, and to impose restrictions on admission for such persons, in order to prevent them from providing support to the regime and increase pressure on the regime to change its policies of repression. These measures also aim to reduce the risk of undermining the effectiveness of restrictive measures by targeting the regime's ability to resort to proceeds from narcotics trade to continue its policy of repression.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 147, 1.6.2013, p. 14.

- (6) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 25 persons and 8 entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP.
- (7) Decision 2013/255/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP is amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added to the list set out in Section A (Persons):

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'327.	Wasim Badia AL-ASSAD وسيم بديع الأسد	Date of birth: 18.7.1980; Place of birth: Qardaha/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Wasim Badia al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad's cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family. Wasim Badia al-Assad is also involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. In particular, he has been involved in the production of Captagon and is responsible for drug shipments. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
328.	Samer Kamal AL-ASSAD a.k.a. 'Samir' سامر كمال الأسد	Date of birth: 19.5.1973; Place of birth: Qardaha, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Samer Kamal al-Assad is a member of the Assad family. He operates in the context of the narcotics trade, in particular in its production. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
329.	Mudar Rifaat AL-ASSAD a.k.a. 'Rifa'at' مضر رفعت الأسد	Date of birth: 1964; Place of birth: Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Mudar Rifaat al-Assad is Bashar al-Assad's cousin; he is therefore a member of the Assad family.	24.4.2023
330.	Mohammad SHALISH محمد شاليش	Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Mohammad Shalish has close ties to the regime. He is linked to drug operations and more specifically to the Captagon trade in the Latakia region. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
331.	Waseem Omar AL-MASALMA وسيم عمر المسالمة	Date of birth: 27.8.1981; Place of birth: Bosra Al-Sham/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Waseem Omar al-Masalma is a leader of a regime-affiliated militia. Waseem Omar al-Masalma is involved in the regime-led trade in Captagon in Southern Syria, especially in Deraa. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
332.	Amer Tayseer KHITI عامر تيسير خيتي	Date of birth: 31.7.1980; Place of birth: Douma/Rif Dimashq Governorate/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Amer Tayseer Khiti is a leading businessperson operating in Syria with interests in real estate, construction and industry. He has close ties to the Assad family. He is a supporter of president al-Assad and organised rallies for him. Amer Tayseer Khiti is also involved in Captagon smuggling operations and bought up real estate in order to invest in packaging facilities used for drug smuggling. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
333.	Abdellatif HAMID a.k.a. 'Hamida' عبد اللطيف حميدة	Date of birth: 1.12.1977; Place of birth: Aleppo, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Abdellatif Hamid has close ties to the Assad family. Abdellatif Hamid owns a factory in Aleppo that has been implicated in Captagon production and trafficking. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
334.	Nouh ZAITER Noah ZAITER Noah ZAYTAR نوح زعيتر	Date of birth: 1977; Place of birth: Zahle, Lebanon; Nationality: Lebanese; Gender: male	Nouh Zaiter is associated with members of the Assad family. He is involved in the trafficking of Captagon in Lebanon and Syria. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
335.	Taher AL-KAYALI طاهر الكيالي	Date of birth: 13.12.1959; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Taher Al-Kayali is a Syrian businessman who owns several companies including Neptunus LLC. Through his companies he is involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon, especially in terms of transportation from the port of Latakia. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
336.	Imad Abu ZUREIQ Emad Abu ZURAIQ Imad Abu ZREIK عماد أبو زريق	Date of birth: 1982; Place of birth: Nasib, Daraa (Syria); Nationality: Syrian; Suspected location: Daraa, Syria; Gender: male	Imad Abu Zureiq is a leading member of a regime-affiliated militia in Southwest Syria that reports directly to the Syrian regime's Military Security branch. Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
337.	Mustafa AL-MASALMAH a.k.a. Mustafa AL-KASAM/QASIM مصطفى المسالمة/الكسم	Nationality: Syrian; Suspected location: Daraa al-Balad, Syria; Gender: male	Mustafa al-Masalmah leads a regime-affiliated militia that reports directly to the Syrian regime's Military Security branch. Currently his militia profits from the war economy, including the trafficking in the synthetic drug Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime, and is associated with it.	24.4.2023
338.	Hassan Muhammad DAQQOU حسن محمد دقو	Date of birth: 1.2.1985; Place of birth: Tfail, Lebanon; Nationality: Syrian/Lebanese; Gender: male	Hassan Muhammad Daqqou has close ties with the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Daqqou has established a wide drug trafficking network in Lebanon and Syria and built Captagon manufacturing plants close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
339.	Jihad BARAKAT جهاد بركات	Date of birth: 1964; Place of birth: Qardahah/Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Jihad Barakat is, through marriage, associated with the Assad family. He is also leader of a regime-affiliated militia and continues to hold different military and intelligence functions for the regime.	24.4.2023
340.	Raji FALHOUT راجي فلحوط	Date of birth: 3.10.1985; Place of birth: Atil, Syria; Position: Syrian regime-affiliated militia leader; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Raji Falhout leads a militia that is associated with the Syrian Military Intelligence. Raji Falhout is also involved in drug trafficking linked to Captagon. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
341.	Muhammad ABDO ASSAAD a.k.a. Asa'ad محمد عبده أسعد	Date of birth: 19.7.1975; Place of birth: Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Assaad Building, Main Street, Ain Tineh, Damascus Countryside; Other identifying information: Father: Abdo Assaad; Gender: male	Muhammad Abdo Assaad is the leader of the Hosn al-Watan militia, which fought on behalf of the Syrian regime. Most recently, he has founded the Aman for Protection and Security LLC, which offers private security services and operates as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
342.	Samer AL-DIBIS سامر الدبیس (a.k.a. Samer AL-DIBS, Samir)	Date of birth: 30.3.1962; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Naher Street, Rawda, Damascus, Syria; Gender: male	Samer al-Dibis is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active in several sectors of the economy, especially in the chemical industry and in real estate. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Syrian-Chinese Business Council and the chairman of the Damascus and Rural Damascus Chamber of Industry. He is also a member of Parliament and a close associate of Maher al-Assad. In these functions Samer al-Dibis benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
343.	Ali Najib IBRAHIM علي نجيب إبراهيم (a.k.a. Ali NajeebIBRAHIM)	Date of birth: 1991; Position: businessperson; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Al-Malki, Damascus, Syria; Gender: male	Ali Najib Ibrahim is a leading businessperson operating in Syria, active also in the telecommunications sector. He owns several shell companies, which have been linked to the Syrian regime in attempts to circumvent sanctions. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
344.	Jamal ISMAIL a.k.a. Ismael جمال إسماعيل	Nationality: Syrian; Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate; Gender: male	Jamal al-Ismael was the commander of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when his unit killed at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon ('Tadamon massacre'). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023
345.	Jamal AL-KHATIB جمال الخطيب	Associated entities: Military Intelligence Directorate	Jamal al-Khatib was a commanding officer in Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013 when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon ('Tadamon massacre'). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023
346.	Osama AL-MALIKI a.k.a. Usama أسامة المالكي	Date of birth: 1963; Place of birth: Damascus, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Villa 98, Sharqiyyat, Jazira al-Khamisa, Qura al-Assad, Damascus Countryside, Syria; Other identifying information: Father: Mohammad al-Maliki – محمد المالكي Gender: male	Osama al-Maliki is majority owner of Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Osama al-Maliki therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
347.	Fadi SAQR فادي أحمد (a.k.a. Fady SAKR, Fadi SAQER, Fadi SAQIR)	Date of birth: 1975 Place of birth: Jablah, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Fadi Saqr is a leader of the “National Defense Forces” (NDF) militia in Damascus that has fought on behalf of the regime since at least 2012. Fadi Saqr therefore is a member of a regime-affiliated militia. Fadi Saqr was part of the chain of command in the massacre of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon on 13 April 2013 (“Tadamon massacre”). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023
348.	Ahmad Ali TAHER احمد علي طاهر	Date of birth: 1982; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor; Associated individuals: Brother: Khodr Taher; Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC; Other identifying information: Father: Ali Taher; Gender: male	Ahmad Ali Taher owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
349.	Amjad YOUSSEF a.k.a. Yusuf, Yousef أمجد يوسف	Nationality: Syrian; Gender: male	Amjad Youssef is a Warrant Officer in the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate. He was a member of Branch 227 of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Syrian regime on 13 April 2013, when he participated in the killing of at least 41 civilians in the town of Tadamon (“Tadamon massacre”). He is therefore responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population in Syria.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
350.	Osama RAMADAN a.k.a. Usama أسامة رمضان	Date of birth: 1973; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Damascus, Mazze, Western Villas, Saraya 36 Building, 3rd Floor; Business Associate: Ahmad Ali Taher; Associated entities: Castle Security and Protection LLC; Other identifying information: Father: Hassan Ramadan; Gender: male	Osama Ramadan owns shares in Castle Security and Protection LLC, which operates as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, led by the Maher al-Assad. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
351.	Ali Mhanna SULEIMAN علي مهنا سليمان	Date of birth: 1987; Place of birth: Al-Raml, Kherbet Maaza, Tartus, Syria; Nationality: Syrian; Address: Tartus, Khirbit Maaza, 36th Estate, Ghaya Estate Area; National ID Number: 10040018920; Father's Name: Mhanna; Mother's Name: Insaf; Gender: male	Ali Suleiman was the leader of the Sahab Regiment of a Syrian Arab Army division known as "Tiger Forces". He is a close associate of Suhayl Hassan. He has been involved in financing the regime, including through the smuggling of fuel. He also benefits from his association with the regime, such as from opportunities in real estate development. He therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023'

(2) the following entries are added to the list set out in Section B (entities):

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'83.	Fourth Armoured Division of the Syrian Army الفرقة الرابع	Place of registration: Damascus; Principal place of business: Syrian regime territory in Syria; Associated individuals: Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Belal	The Fourth Armoured Division is one of the most prominent military units of the Syrian army led by Maher al-Assad and commanded by Ghassan Bilal. The Fourth Armoured Division is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population. The Fourth Armoured Division also profits from the war economy, especially the trafficking in Captagon. Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. Therefore, the Fourth Armoured Division benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
84.	Neptunus LLC/Neptune LLC company شركة نبتونوس المحدودة المسؤولة نبتونس أوفرسيز المحدودة	Place of registration: Latakia, Syria; Date of registration: 2017	Neptunus LLC is involved in drug operations in the port of Latakia. Neptunus LLC therefore benefits and supports the regime. Neptunus LLC was co-founded by Taher Al-Kayali.	24.4.2023
85.	Areen foundation/مؤسسة العرين	Place of registration: Syria; Date of registration: 1999; Principal place of business: Syria; Associated individuals: Asma al-Assad (wife of Bashar al-Assad and Director)	The al-Areen foundation poses as a charitable foundation, but is closely affiliated with Syrian regime militias. The al-Areen foundation is directed by the president's wife, Asma Al-Assad. The foundation is channelling aid in line with the policies and priorities of the regime, and therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
86.	Stroytransgaz/Стройтрансгаз	Other information: Stroytransgaz Group, Stroytransgaz (STG) Logistic, Stroytransgaz (STG) Engineering, STG Engineering	Stroytransgaz is a Russian engineering and construction company operating in Syria, which amongst other things assumed control of Syria's largest phosphate mines. Stroytransgaz therefore benefits from and supports the Syrian regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
87.	Gecopham, the General Company for Phosphate and Mines الشركة العامة للفوسفات و المناجم	Address: Palmyra Road, Homs, Syrian Arab Republic; Phone: 00963312751122; Email: info@gecopham.sy; General Manager: Younes Ramadan	Gecopham is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and provides financial support to the regime. It therefore supports the regime.	24.4.2023
88.	Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC شركة الجبل لخدمات الحماية والحراسة	Address: F6XR+495, Malek Bin Rabeaa, Damascus, Syria; Type of entity: Limited Liability Company; Place of registration: Damascus; Date of registration: 19.10.2017; Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria; Associated individuals: Osama Mohammad al-Maliki	Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC is owned and managed by Osama al-Maliki. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC acts as a shell company to allow for the continuation of activities of the Saraya al-Areen 313 militia, a regime-affiliated militia. Al-Jabal Security and Protection LLC therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023
89.	Castle for Security and Protection LLC شركة القلعة للحماية والحراسة والخدمات الأمني a.k.a. Castle Security and Protection LLC, Citadel for Security and Protection	Address: Saraya Roundabout, Western Villas, Mazze, Damascus, Syria; Type of entity: Limited Liability Company; Place of registration: Damascus, Syria; Date of registration: 18.10.2017; Registration number: / Principal place of business: Damascus, Syria; Other information: Sector: Militia turned Security Company; Phone Number: +963116119331; +963943800808	Castle for Security and Protection LLC is a private company, which acts as a shell company for the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army, which is led by Maher al-Assad. Castle for Security is involved also in the trafficking of narcotics. The Captagon trade has become a regime-led business model, enriching the inner circle of the regime and forming its lifeline. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
90.	Aman for Protection and Security LLC شركة أمان للحماية والحراسة الأمنية	Address: Damascus Countryside; Type of entity: Limited Liability Company; Place of registration: Damascus Countryside; Date of registration: 10.10.2018; Registration number: 2906; Principal place of business: Damascus Countryside, Syria; Associated individuals: Muhammad Abdo Assad	Aman for Protection and Security LLC is a private security company, which acts as a shell company for the Hosn al-Watan militia, founded by Muhammad Abdo Assaad. It therefore benefits from and supports the regime.	24.4.2023'

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/848**of 24 April 2023****amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 20 September 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 ⁽¹⁾.
- (2) In view of the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, two persons and one group should be added to the list of persons, groups, undertakings and entities set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693.
- (3) Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

⁽¹⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 of 20 September 2016 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common Position 2002/402/CFSP (OJ L 255, 21.9.2016, p. 25).

ANNEX

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added under the heading 'A. Persons referred to in Articles 2 and 3':

- '15. Abu Yasir HASSAN (a.k.a. Sheikh Hassan, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan, Yaseer Hassan, Abu Qasim); date of birth: 1981 to 1983; place of birth: Pwani Region, Tanzania; gender: male; nationality: Tanzanian.
16. Bonomade Machude OMAR (a.k.a. Ibn Omar, Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, Abu Sorraca, Abu Surakha, Abu Suraqa Suraqa Filho, Omar Saide, Sheikh Omar); date of birth: 15 June 1988; place of birth: Palma district, Cabo Delgado province, Mozambique; gender: male; nationality: Mozambican.;

(2) the following entry is added under the heading 'B. Groups, undertakings and entities referred to in Article 3':

- '5. ISIS-Mozambique (a.k.a. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Mozambique, Islamic State -Mozambique, ISIL-M, Ansar Al-Sunna, Al-Shabaab, Al-Shabaab in Mozambique, Mozambique Wilaya of the Islamic State, Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaah (ASwJ), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa, Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, Ahlu Sunnah Wajamo, Swahili Sunna).'

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2023/849**of 24 April 2023****implementing Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran**

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 3(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/235/CFSP.
- (2) On 25 September 2022, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a declaration on behalf of the Union deploring the widespread and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian security forces against non-violent protestors, noting that it had resulted in the loss of lives as well as a large number of injuries. The declaration also spelled out that those responsible for the killing of Mahsa Amini must be held accountable, and called on the Iranian authorities to ensure transparent and credible investigations to clarify the number of deaths and arrests, to release all non-violent protestors and to provide due process to all detainees. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that Iran's decision to severely restrict internet access and block instant messaging platforms blatantly violates freedom of expression. Finally, the declaration stated that the Union will consider all options at its disposal to address the killing of Mahsa Amini and the way Iranian security forces have responded to the ensuing demonstrations.
- (3) In this context, and in line with the Union's commitment to address all issues of concern with Iran, including the human rights situation, as confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2022, eight persons and one entity should be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP.
- (4) Decision 2011/235/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 100, 14.4.2011, p. 51.

Done at Luxembourg, 24 April 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

ANNEX

The following eight persons and one entity are added to the list of persons and entities set out in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP:

Persons

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'214.	NOBAVEH VATAN Bijan بیژن نوباوه وطن	DOB: 1959/1960 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament	Bijan Nobaveh Vatan is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as the First Deputy Chairman of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament. He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as "Muharebeh", or "enmity against God". Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them. As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Nobaveh Vatan supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
215.	YAZDIKHAH Ali علی یزدی خواه	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Function: Member of the Iranian Parliament; Member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament	<p>Ali Yazdikhah is an Iranian lawmaker and hardliner as well as a member of the Culture Commission of the Iranian Parliament.</p> <p>He is one of the 227 members of parliament who signed a statement on 6 November 2022 praising security forces for killing protestors and urging the judiciary to accelerate trials and sentence protestors to death by declaring them as “Muharebeh”, or “enmity against God”.</p> <p>Moreover, he is a driving force behind legislation enforcing restrictive clothing rules on women by enacting penalties for institutions, businesses and individuals that interact with non-compliant women, thus creating a boycott against them.</p> <p>As a Member of the Iranian Parliament, Yazdikhah supported the killing, detention and torture of people during the 2022/2023 nationwide protests in Iran. He further supports legislation that substantially revokes the social and economic rights of women in Iran.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
216.	ALIBABAEI Mehdi مهدی علی بابایی (a.k.a. ALI BABAEI Mehdi, BABAEI Ali Mehdi)	Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Rank: Major Function: provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom	<p>Major Mehdi Alibabaei is the provincial deputy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Qom. He directs IRGC and Basij forces in the city of Qom.</p> <p>Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, some of the most intense protests have been seen in the city of Qom. Security forces, including the IRGC and the Basij militia were deployed to violently crack down on these protests. Since March 2023, the IRGC and Basij militia have also been instructed to enforce the mandatory hijab law by new methods of oppression.</p> <p>Alibabaei revealed a new scheme to deploy members of the Basij militia in each Qom neighbourhood to enforce the hijab law. The new scheme includes installing programs such as “Be a famous leader in our neighbourhood”, ordering IRGC/Basij forces to conduct neighbourhood patrols, the use of intelligence, intimidation, and enforcing accountability of regular citizens (for example by appealing to the responsibility of building and residence managers for “badly veiled” residents). This scheme represents a new level of denunciation and information gathering by the general population to oppress women.</p> <p>Under the command of Alibabaei, the local IRGC and Basij forces in Qom are ordered to enforce certain selected laws, by means and methods that intimidate citizens and violate their fundamental rights.</p> <p>As provincial deputy of the IRGC in Qom, Major Mehdi Alibabaei is responsible for the acts of oppression committed by the local IRGC and Basij forces and their violations of the rights of freedom of expression and privacy.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
217.	<p>NOUROUZI Ali Asghar (a.k.a. NOROUZI Ali Asghar)</p>	<p>DOB: 11.11.1962 POB: Dashtestan, Bushehr province, Iran Address: Unit 29, 5th Floor, Talaieh Block-B1, Elahiyeh Complex 1, Number 0, Alley 2-Shahid Sajjad Rushanai, Rabbaninejad Street, Zein Aldin Municipality, Qom 3739144673, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport no: Y53914915 (Iran) expires 11.5.2026 Iranian national ID no: 4591967573 Function: chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Seyyed Aminollah; Emami Tabatabai; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Ali Asghar Nourouzi is the chairman of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As chairman of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ali Asghar Nourouzi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
218.	TABATABAI Seyyed Amin Ala Emami (a.k.a. TABATBAYI Aminallah Imami)	DOB: 26.8.1963 POB: Meybod, Iran Address: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Iranian national ID no: 4489260229 Function: vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation; managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC	Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is the vice-chairman of the board of directors as well as the managing director of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation. The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression. As vice-chairman of the board of directors and managing director of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out. He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
219.	<p>ALAODDINI Yahya (a.k.a. ALA'ODDINI Yahya; ALAEDDINI Yahya)</p>	<p>DOB: 21.5.1965 POB: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Passport no: K47201906 (Iran) expires 19.10.2023 Iranian national ID no: 0036732958 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Jamal Babamoradi; Ahmad Karimi;; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Yahya Alaoddini is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Yahya Alaoddini is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
220.	BABAMORADI Jamal Ali	<p>DOB: 24.5.1960 POB: Tehran, Iran Address: Tehran, Iran Nationality: Iranian Gender: male Iranian national ID no: 0036824240 Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Ahmad Karimi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah IRGC</p>	<p>Jamal Ali Babamoradi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Jamal Ali Babamoradi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
221.	KARIMI Ahmad Hasan	<p>DOB: 11.12.1962</p> <p>POB: Qom, Iran</p> <p>Address: Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Nationality: Iranian</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Iranian national ID no: 0382947983</p> <p>Function: member of the board of directors of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation</p> <p>Associated individuals: Ali Asghar Nourouzi; Yahya Alaoddini; Seyyed Amin Ala Emami Tabatabai; Jamal Ali Babamoradi</p> <p>Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation/Bonyad Taavon Sepah</p> <p>IRGC</p>	<p>Ahmad Hasan Karimi is a member of the board of directors of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Cooperative Foundation.</p> <p>The IRGC has been at the forefront of the repression of the 2022/2023 protests in Iran which has seen more than 520 people killed, over 70 of whom were minors, and more than 22 000 arrests/imprisonments effected.</p> <p>The IRGC Cooperative Foundation is the body responsible for managing the IRGC's investments and in that framework it is responsible for funnelling money into the regime's brutal repression.</p> <p>As member of the board of directors of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, Ahmad Hasan Karimi is therefore responsible for willingly and knowingly providing the instruments with which the brutal and ongoing repression has been carried out.</p> <p>He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023'

Entities

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'35.	Ariantel	<p>Address: Ariantel Head Office, No 15, 15th alley, South Gandhi Street, Tehran, Iran</p> <p>Website: http://www.ariantel.ir</p> <p>Type of entity: private company</p>	<p>Ariantel is an Iranian mobile service provider which has been at the forefront of rolling-out the comprehensive telecommunications surveillance architecture mapped out by the Iranian Government to quash dissent and critical voices in Iran.</p> <p>Ariantel has actively sought, and makes use of, cyberware products used to monitor, geolocate and intercept calls and other mobile communications activities of its users at the request of the Iranian Government. This information has subsequently been used to quash and disrupt protests and to identify, target and arrest peaceful protesters and activists.</p> <p>Therefore, Ariantel is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.</p>	24.4.2023'

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)
ISSN 1725-2555 (paper edition)



Publications Office
of the European Union
L-2985 Luxembourg
LUXEMBOURG

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